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GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO COMBAT GLOBAL
WARMING
Jeffrey T. Lindgren*
INTRODUCTION
Global warming is presently one of the preeminent environmental is-
sues facing the world. Many scholars claim that global warming will
have "ultimate consequences ... second only to global nuclear war."1
Skeptics, however, claim that the global warming theory lacks a suffi-
cient scientific basis.' The lack of scientific certainty creates difficulty
in international negotiations aimed at combatting the causes of global
warming. The severity of the potential consequences, however, requires
immediate action to arrest the threat to the global community.
Global warming, or the greenhouse effect, has two components: an
increase of certain greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), ni-
trous oxide (N2O), methane (CH,), tropospheric ozone (0,), and
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security (July 5, 1988),
statement from conference held in Toronto, Canada on June 27-30, 1988, reprinted in
Selected Legal Materials, 5 Ai. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 515, para. 1 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Toronto Conference Statement].
2. Kriz, Ozone and Evidence, Nat'l J., Nov. 11, 1989, at 45. In the Bush Adminis-
tration, White House chief of staff John H. Sununu and White House science advisor
D. Allan Bromley feel that the scientific evidence of the greenhouse effect is unconvinc-
ing and carbon dioxide (CO2) controls are unnecessary and too costly at this time. Id.
See generally Stevens, With Cloudy Crystal Balls. Scientists Race to Assess Global
Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at Cl (discussing how the computer models used
to estimate the effects of global warming fail to take into account important factors,
thereby limiting their accuracy); Shabecoff, Global Warmth In '88 Is Found To Set a
Record, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1989, at Al (citing the temperature data of 1988);
Shabecoff, U.S. Data Since 1895 Fail To Show Warming Trend, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1989, at Al (reviewing a NOAA report which concludes that climate data from 1895
fails to support global warming); Browne, Was That a Greenhouse Effect? It Depends
on Your Theory, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1988, § 4, at I (discussing the conflicting con-
clusions about the greenhouse effect); Bluestone, Smith & Yanchinski, The Global
Greenhouse Finally Has Leaders Sweating, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 1988, at 74 (observing
the recognition of global warming by world leaders); Shabecoff, Temperature For
World Rises Sharply In The 1980's, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1988, at C4 (analyzing the
climate data of the 1980's).
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the atmosphere;3 and the absorption and
long wave heat radiation attributed to these gases.4 The second compo-
nent causes the global temperature to rise. 5 Temperature increase has a
number of adverse environmental consequences such as sea level rise,0
changing weather and precipitation patterns, 7 and loss of plant and
animal species.8 CO, is the most significant gas because it is conveyed
directly and indirectly through the generation of electricity using fossil
fuels, which include gas, oil, and coal.'
International environmental law principles are insufficient to deal
with global warming.' 0 The Trail Smelter Arbitration establishes an
important principle of international environmental law that is applica-
ble to global warming." This international action involving trans-
boundary air pollution resolved that states may not use their territory
in a manner which injures another state. 2 The facts of the case, specif-
3. B. BOLIN, B. Doos, J. JAGER & R. WARRICK, THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, CLI-
MATIC CHANGE, AND ECOSYSTEMS 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter GREENHOUSE EFFECT).
4. Id.
5. Zaelke & Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change - An Overview of
the International Legal Process, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 253 (1990).
Whether the greenhouse effect will cause global temperatures to rise is subject to con-
siderable debate because many experts come to conflicting conclusions. See e.g.
Shabecoff, Global Warming: Experts Ponder Bewildering Feedback Effects, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at C1 (discussing the theories which conclude the greenhouse
effect may cause cooling, not warming).
6. Zaelke & Cameron, supra note 5, at 255.
7. Solomon & Freedberg, The Greenhouse Effect: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 20
ENVTL. L. 83, 84 (1990). Experts disagree about the types of changes likely to occur in
weather and precipitation patterns due to the greenhouse effect. Shabecoff, supra note
5, at Cl.
8. Solomon & Freedburg, supra note 7, at 94.
9. GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 3, at 8. Fossil fuels provide roughly 80% of
world wide energy consumption and 90% of the energy needs for the United States.
Wald, Fighting the Greenhouse Effect, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1988, § 3, at 1.
10. Pallemaerts, International Legal Aspects of Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, 1988 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 205.
11. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1907 (1941) reprinted in
35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). The United States claimed that pollution from a Cana-
dian smelter caused damage to property in the state of Washington. Id. An arbitration
tribunal was created and subsequently determined that Canada was liable for the past
damage. Id. The tribunal had made the damages determination in a prior interim deci-
sion. 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939).
12. Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965 reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L.
at 716. The tribunal specifically stated:
No state has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes or to the territory of another, of the properties of persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
Id. This decision is sometimes characterized as obiter dictum because Canada had pre-
viously accepted liability for past damage done by the smelter. Pallemaerts, supra note
10, at 205.
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ically the liability determination, however, fail to make the rule univer-
sally applicable.1 3
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
adopted Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration reiterating the prin-
ciple used to decide Trail Smelter.14 Principle 21 recognizes that states
have the right to use their resources as they wish and the responsibility
to ensure that their activities do not injure other states.1 0 Together,
Trail Smelter and Principle 21 establish a fundamental precept of in-
ternational environmental law.' 6 This principle, however, is not easily
applicable to problems of atmospheric pollution because of the diffi-
culty in tracing this type of pollution to a specific source.17 This inabil-
13. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 205. The damage caused in Trail Smelter was
directly traceable to the Canadian smelter. Id. The principle is inapplicable to acid rain
and the release of compounds that destroy the ozone layer because of the difficulty in
tracing the damage back to a specific source. Id. See infra note 17 (discussing the
causes of acid rain and ozone layer depletion).
14. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 48/14 and
Corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E. 73. II. A.14 and Corr., reprinted in II I.L.M. 1416
(1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
15. Id. at 1420. Principle 21 provides that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pur-
suant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
The first clause does not detract from the duty not to cause damage in other states.
Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 206. Although not legally binding, this statement con-
firms the existing rule of customary international law on transfrontier pollution enunci-
ated in Trail Smelter. Id.
16. See P. SANDS, CHERNOBYL, LAW AND COMMUNICATION: TRANSBOUNDARY Nu-
CLEAR AIR POLLUTION - THE LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 15 (P. Sands ed. 1988) (stating
that both Trail Smelter and Principle 21 establish a rule of customary international
law).
17. J. BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND REGULATION 13 (1988). Gaseous SO or NO, emissions enter the atmosphere and
oxidize into sulphate or nitrate particles forming acid rain. Id. at 10-13. The particles
then transform into sulfuric or nitric acid in the presence of water vapor. Id. at 13.
Once in this form the pollutants may be transported thousands of miles from their
source of emission, depending on meteorological forces, before being released into the
environment in the form of rain, snow, or fog. Id. at 8. This process makes it difficult to
determine the source when many industrial nations are located within the region, as is
the case of Europe, and bilateral agreements are insufficient to resolve the problem. Id.
Bilateral negotiations will not resolve ozone layer depletion for the same reasons that
they will not resolve acid rain problems. Id. at 35. The release of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) into the atmosphere causes a chemical reaction in which chlorine destroys the
ozone layer. Id. at 38-39. Most ozone depleting compounds are released from sites in
industrialized nations and the effects are uneven. Id. Ozone depletion has been identi-
fied in areas of the northern hemisphere and above Antarctica, but the loss of the ozone
19921
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ity to identify specific sources led to international agreements on trans-
boundary air pollution and ozone layer depletion. 8
An international conference, which began meeting in Washington in
February, 1991, and periodically over the following eighteen months,
will attempt to forge an agreement to control the emissions of green-
house gases.' 9 Over twenty industrialized nations have committed
themselves to stabilizing or reducing CO, emissions, the gas which
plays the largest role in global warming. 0 The challenge for the confer-
ence delegates is to bring as many nations as possible into the agree-
ment and to develop a framework for actual reductions tied to environ-
mental needs. Analysis of existing atmospheric environmental
agreements reveals how a global warming agreement should be
constructed.
This Comment will examine how existing agreements on the atmos-
pheric environment should affect negotiations on global warming. Part
I analyzes international agreements which cover long-range trans-
boundary air pollution. Part II analyzes the international agreements
protecting the ozone layer. Part III examines the United States Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Clean Air Act Amendment) which gov-
ern long-range air pollution, ozone layer protection, and the reduction
of certain greenhouse gases. Part IV proposes recommendations for
global warming negotiations; the proposals are not specifically tied to
the global warming conference.
I. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LONG-RANGE
AIR POLLUTION
Evidence linking environmental damage to certain air pollutants
transported through rainfall sparked the international movement to
layer affects the global community. Wexler, Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Be-
yond the Montreal Protocol, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 3 (1990).
18. See Note, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution:
Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 452-55
(1989) (discussing the events precipitating international agreements). Regional agree-
ments are not sufficient to adequately address the problem of acid deposition because
pollutants may travel thousands of miles from their source and their effects are global.
J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 8; see supra, note 10 (explaining the inadequacy of
regional agreements).
19. Weisskopf, U.S. Gets Mixed Reviews on Global Warming Plan, Wash. Post,
Feb. 5, 1991, at A3 (noting that more than 130 nations are participating in the confer-
ence). Id.
20. Stevens, Hopeful E.P.A. Report Fans a Debate as Talks on Warming Near,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 1, at 18.
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control and reduce acid rain.2 The inability of unilateral or bilateral
measures to deal with the problem became apparent when coordinated
monitoring studies in Europe demonstrated that emissions from sources
in foreign nations caused the majority of acid rain. 2 The Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva Convention) and
its protocols grew out of the need for an international response to the
problems of acid rain.23
A. CONVENTION ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY
AIR POLLUTION
In November, 1979, thirty-four countries adopted the Geneva Con-
vention24 at a High Level Meeting on the Protection of the Environ-
ment in Geneva.25 The Geneva Convention actually entered into force
in March, 1983 and is the first multilateral treaty designed to protect
the atmospheric environment. 26 The Geneva Convention contains
21. Note, supra note 18, at 452-53. Sweden presented the first evidence linking
environmental damage to transboundary air pollution at the 1972 Stockholm Confer-
ence on the Environment. Id. The report presented at the conference is entitled: Swe-
den's Case Study for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.
1972: Air Pollution Across National Boundaries. The Impact on the Environment of
Sulphur in Air and Precipitation. Id.
22. Note, supra note 18, at 454.
23. Id. at 454-55.
24. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature
Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541 (entered into force March, 1983), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1442 (1979) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
25. United Nations: Protocols to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 698, 698 (1988) [hereinafter U.N. Pro-
tocols]. There are 35 signatories to the Geneva Convention: 34 countries and the Euro-
pean Economic Community (E.E.C.). Id. Only 31 countries and the E.E.C. have
ratified the agreement and are considered parties. Id. The 31 countries are: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), United Kingdom (U.K.), United States (U.S.), and
Yugoslavia. Id.
26. Note, supra note 18, at 456. See generally Cameron, International Coopera-
tion and Acid Rain Pollution Establishing the Framework for Control, 18 INT'L J.
ENVTL. STUD. 129 (1982) (examining the Geneva Convention and other forms of inter-
national cooperation in controlling acid rain); Rosencranz, The ECE Convention of
1979 on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 975 (1981)
(reviewing the Geneva Convention as a framework for controlling transfrontier air pol-
lution); Tollan, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 19 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1985) (analyzing the Geneva Convention as a means of con-
trolling transfrontier air pollution); Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pol-
lution The Search for an International Response, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (1984)
(stating that international organizations are the most effective means of combatting
transfrontier air pollution).
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neither pollution reduction measures nor a time frame in which reduc-
tions must be achieved." It simply establishes a mechanism to negoti-
ate and implement pollution reduction measures.28
The Geneva Convention contains a few substantive provisions subject
to numerous qualifications which diminish their effect.29 For example,
the two most important provisions, articles 2 and 6, which define the
basic obligations of the agreement in terms of air pollution control pol-
icy, are limited in scope.3 0 Article 2 explicitly states that the parties
"are determined to protect man and his environment against air pollu-
tion."'" Article 2 is more of a recommendation rather than a legal obli-
gation, because it is subject to two qualifications which do not prohibit
further increases in emissions.3 2
Article 6 compels the parties to develop the best policies and strate-
gies to fight air pollution. 3 The application of this article is restricted
because it contains escape clauses which restrict its scope.3 4 Article 5
27. Note, supra note 18, at 456.
28. Id.
29. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 191-92.
30. Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 2, 6.
31. Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 2. The article states that "[t]he Con-
tracting Parties, taking due account of the facts and problems involved, are determined
to protect man and his environment against air pollution and shall endeavor to limit
and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range
transboundary air pollution." Id.
32. Id. The two qualifications reduce the scope of the provision. Id. First, the fun-
damental principle is subject to "the facts and problems involved." Id. This qualifica-
tion enables states to change the applicability of this article depending on the facts of
the situation. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 191.
Second, the parties merely agree to "endeavor to limit and, as far as possible, gradu-
ally reduce and prevent air pollution." Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 2.
The use of the word "endeavor," rather than a word such as undertake or require,
leaves the decision to act to the discretion of the party. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at
191.
33. Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 6. The article reads, in pertinent
part:
[I]n order to combat air pollution, in particular that originating from new or
rebuilt installations, each Contracting Party undertakes to develop the best poli-
cies and strategies including air quality management systems and, as part of
them, control measures compatible with balanced development, in particular by
using the best available technology which is economically feasible and low-waste
and non-waste technology.
Id.
34. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 192. This provision targets "new or rebuilt in-
stallations," in contrast to older installations which tend to emit more pollution, thus
limiting its scope. Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 6.
There are also "compatibility with balanced development" and "economic feasibil-
ity" qualifications. Id. These qualifications leave the application of control technology
to the discretion of the parties. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 192. During the negotia-
tions, the parties were concerned with binding themselves to pollution reduction proce-
dures which would hamper their industrial development or growth plans. Id.
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contains a surprisingly broad obligation to consult.33 This provision pro-
vides that the interests of a concerned neighboring state be heard and
considered early in the planning stage of a project contemplated pursu-
ant to this Convention. 6
The Geneva Convention also recognizes the importance of the ex-
change of technological research and scientific information to help
identify causes and potential remedies for acid deposition.3" This agree-
ment, however, does not provide any pollution reduction measures or
time frames in which to reduce pollution.38 The Convention's primary
contribution is that it is the first multilateral agreement devoted to pro-
tecting the global atmospheric environment from long-range trans-
boundary air pollution.39
B. PROTOCOL ON LONG-TERM FINANCING OF EMEP
The first protocol to the Geneva Convention, The Protocol on Long-
Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Eu-
rope (EMEP Protocol), was adopted in September 1984.40 The EMEP
Protocol simply establishes permanent funding for the EMEP region-
35. Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5. The article reads:
Consultations shall be held, upon request, at an early stage between, on the one
hand, Contracting Parties which are actually affected by or exposed to a signifi-
cant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution and, on the other hand, Con-
tracting Parties within which and subject to whose jurisdiction a significant con-
tribution to long-range transboundary air pollution originates, or could originate,
in connection with activities carried on or contemplated therein.
Id.
36. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 178.
37. Note, supra note 18, at 456.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evalua-
tion of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), adopted
and opened for signature Sept. 28, 1984, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 698, 701 (1988) [here-
inafter EMEP Protocol]. This protocol was ratified by: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, German
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein.
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrain-
ian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.K., United States, Yugoslavia, and the E.E.C. Id. at 698. Ca-
nada and the United States are not subject to the mandatory contribution requirement
because the EMEP Protocol only covers Europe; however, they may make voluntary
contributions. EMEP Protocol, supra note 40, at arts. 3-4. Ratification by three addi-
tional countries is necessary for the EMEP Protocol to enter into force. EMEP Proto-
col, supra note 40, at art. 10.
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wide pollution monitoring program41 and, therefore, is not the subject
of this analysis. This protocol covers only Europe and requires all par-
ties to make mandatory contributions to EMEP at levels specified
within the agreement.42 Nonetheless, the EMEP Protocol is significant
because it is the first agreement to require mandatory contributions to
fund the monitoring of long-range transboundary air pollution.43
C. PROTOCOL ON THE REDUCTION OF SULPHUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
OR THEIR TRANSBOUNDARY FLUXES BY AT LEAST THIRTY PERCENT
In July, 1985, the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent (SO, Protocol)
was adopted in Helsinki.44 It entered into force in September, 1987.40
This protocol imposes legal obligations to reduce and limit long-range
transboundary air pollution. 46 Sulphur emissions are a source of air pol-
lution that contribute to acidification-related damage in North
America and Europe.47
The SO2 Protocol requires thirty percent reductions in sulfur dioxide
(SO,) emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 1993. 41 The SO, Pro-
41. EMEP Protocol, supra note 40, art. 2. EMEP refers to the Co-operative Pro-
gramme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollu-
tants in Europe. Note, supra note 18, at 458. EMEP is a permanent forum for inter-
governmental negotiation on this issue and acts as a depository for all data on long-
range transmission of air pollutants collected within Europe. Id.
42. EMEP Protocol, supra note 40, at arts. 3-4.
43. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 182.
44. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution on
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30%,
adopted and opened for signature July 8, 1985 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1987),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 698, 707 (1988) [hereinafter SO2 Protocol]. This protocol was
ratified by: Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R.
Id. at 698. The U.K., U.S., Poland and Spain, all major industrial pollution source
states, have not ratified this protocol. Pallemaerts, supra note 10, at 198.
45. SO2 Protocol, supra note 44, at 698.
46. Note, supra note 18, at 469-70.
47. See J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 11-12 (discussing how sulphur emissions are
generated and released into the atmosphere). Sulphur emissions are released in the
combustion of fossil fuels for energy production and through numerous technological
processes in the industrial sector. Id. at 182.
48. SO2 Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 2. The reductions are calculated using 1980
national annual emission levels as the baseline year. Id. Article 3 makes clear that the
30% reduction is not the acceptable level of emissions but only a starting point for
further reductions. SO2 Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 3. Article 3 specifically states
that "[tihe Parties recognize the need for each of them to study at the national level
the necessity for further reductions, beyond those referred to in article 2, of sulphur
emissions or their transboundary fluxes when environmental conditions warrant." Id.
[VOL. 7:367
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tocol also requires parties, without undue delay and within the frame-
work of the Geneva Convention, to develop national programs reducing
sulphur emissions or their transboundary fluxes.49
Although this protocol was a major achievement in creating a legal
obligation to reduce pollution, there are two major criticisms of this
program. First, the thirty percent reduction level is arbitrary and only
constitutes a "first step."'50 This reduction level does not take into ac-
count the fact that certain nations emit more pollution than others and
that certain areas especially sensitive to acid deposition damage may
require increased levels of protection.5" Further, article 2 only requires
that national emissions be reduced and allows each party discretion as
to the implementation of the reduction.52 This may allow specific
sources of damaging pollution to continue to emit sulphur pollutants at
current or even increased levels.53
The second major criticism is the selection of 1980 as the baseline
year. " This selection is also arbitrary and puts the nations which re-
duced their sulphur emissions prior to 1980 at a disadvantage to those
that did not.55 These two criticisms suggest that the protocol had more
to do with negotiation than with meaningful reduction to a level neces-
sary for environmental protection and beneficial change."
Although the SO2 Protocol has been criticized, it is important for two
reasons. It is the first agreement to create a legal obligation to reduce
transboundary air pollution, even if only by a flat rate percentage.5 7
The language of the entire protocol clearly states that this is not the final word on SO,
emissions and that continued reduction is necessary. Pallemaerts, supra note 10. at
199.
49. SO2 Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 6. Article 6 requires:
The parties shall ... develop without undue delay national programmes, policies
and strategies which shall serve as a means of reducing sulphur emissions or
their transboundary fluxes, by at least 30 per cent as soon as possible and at the
latest by 1993, and shall report ... progress towards achieving the goal to the
Executive Body.
Id.
50. Note, supra note 18, at 470.
51. Id. Many parties recognize that greater reductions are necessary to halt the
problems associated with acid rain. Id.
52. SO 2 Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 2. Only total national emission levels must
be reduced; nothing in the language of the provision requires 30 percent reductions to
be made at each source. Id.
53. Note, supra note 18, at 470-71. Under the reduction mechanism of the SO2
Protocol, a party may reduce emissions from the sources which have the least adverse
environmental impact and still meet the obligations of the protocol. Id. at 470.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 469.
57. Id. at 471.
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Further, the weakness of using a flat rate percentage reduction was
sufficiently apparent to cause the consideration of other air pollution
reduction methods.6 8 The SO, Protocol achieved actual reductions in
the levels of sulphur emissions 59 and a number of the parties have
pledged to reduce their sulphur emissions beyond the thirty percent
level.6 0
D. PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONTROL OF EMISSIONS OF
NITROGEN OXIDES OR THEIR TRANSBOUNDARY FLUXES
On November 1, 1988, the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes (NO,
Protocol) was adopted in Sophia, Bulgaria. 1 The agreement calls for
parties to limit or reduce their nitrogen oxides (NO.) emissions to the
level of a specific base-line year. 2 The limits imposed by this protocol
caused great concern because the control techniques and costs for NO,
reduction were not well known.6" Another concern was that reducing
emissions requires decreased use as well as stringent emission standards
of major sources of NO, emissions such as automobiles. 4
The most important provisions of the NO, Protocol are articles 2 and
5. Article 2 contains the basic obligations of the protocol.65 Paragraph
1 establishes the reduction schedule and calculation method.6 Para-
58. Id. at 472.
59. Id. at 471.
60. Id. As of 1988, ten parties had pledged to reduce their emissions by 50% by
1995. Id. Four of these pledged to reduce their emissions to 33% of their 1980 levels.
Id.
61. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides, adopted and opened for sig-
nature Nov. 1, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989). The protocol was ratified by:
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R, United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
62. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2 para. 1. This provision obligates parties
to control or reduce their emissions or transboundary fluxes to the national level of
emissions in 1987 or any other year that does not exceed the 1987 level. Id.
63. Note, supra note 18, at 472.
64. Id. NO, also arises from stationary sources during the combustion process from
oxidation of nitrogen contained in the fuel and in the surrounding air. See id. at 472
n.177.
65. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2.
66. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2, para. 1. The actual language of the
protocol reads:
The Parties shall, as soon as possible and as a first step, take effective measures
to control and/or reduce their national annual emissions of nitrogen oxide or
their transboundary fluxes so that these, at the least by 31 December 1994, do
[VOL. 7:367
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graph 2 obligates the parties to apply national annual emissions stan-
dards to new or substantially modified stationary sources and to new
mobile sources (automobiles).17 This paragraph also requires the intro-
duction of pollution control measures for major existing stationary
sources.6 Paragraph 3 compels the parties to commence negotiations to
further reduce NO, emissions while taking into account scientific and
technological developments and internationally accepted critical
loads.69 The parties must cooperate in the establishment of critical
loads.7 0 The use of critical loads is crucial because it links actual emis-
sions reductions to substantive environmental goals.71
Article 5 requires the parties to review the protocol on a regular ba-
sis commencing within one year after the ratification of the protocol.7 2
This basic provision allows the protocol to develop at the same pace as
the science and technology of NO, emission reduction. Together, arti-
not exceed their national annual emissions of nitrogen oxides or transboundary
fluxes of such emissions for the calendar year 1987 or any previous year to be
specified upon signature of, or accession to, the Protocol, provided that in addi-
tion, with respect to any Party specifying such a previous year, its national aver-
age annual transboundary fluxes or national annual emissions of nitrogen oxides
for the period from 1 January 1987 to I January 1996 do not exceed its trans-
boundary fluxes or national emissions for the calendar year 1987.
Id. The last part of paragraph I prevents parties from increasing their emissions by
choosing a year other than 1987 which has a higher annual emissions level. Id.
67. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2, para. 2(a)-(b). These obligations are
qualified by being based on the "best available technologies which are economically
feasible." Id.
68. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2, para. 2(c). This obligation is qualified
by taking into consideration "the characteristics of the plant, its age and its rate of
utilization and the need to avoid undue operational disruption." Id. Unlike the CO2
Protocol, this protocol covers existing stationary sources. Id. Unfortunately the largest
source of NO, emissions, existing mobile sources, are conspicuous in their absence. Id.
69. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2, para. 3(a). Paragraph 3(a) states:
The Parties shall, as a second step, commence negotiations, no later than six
months after the date of entry into force of the present Protocol, on further steps
to reduce national annual emissions of nitrogen oxides or transboundary fluxes of
such emissions, taking into account the best available scientific and technological
developments, internationally accepted critical loads and other elements resulting
from the work programme undertaken under article 6.
Id.
70. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2 para. 3(b). Critical loads are defined as
"a quantitative estimate of the exposure to one or more pollutants below which signifi-
cant harmful effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment do not occur
according to present knowledge." NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 1, para. 7.
71. Note, supra note 18, at 474.
72. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 5. Article 5 states "[t]he Parties shall
regularly review the present Protocol, taking into account the best available scientific
substantiation and technological development. The first review shall take place no later
than one year after the date of entry into force of the present Protocol." Id.
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cles 2 and 5 require the parties to implement a coordinated, regional
approach to address the problems of NO, emissions. 3
The NO, Protocol is important for a number of reasons. The most
important is the subsequent establishment of critical loads.7 4 The criti-
cal loads approach has several advantages over the flat rate percentage
reduction approach used in the SO, Protocol. This approach links ac-
tual emissions reductions to specific environmental goals, something
which arbitrary flat rate percentage reductions are unable to do.70
Critical loads also protect specific ecosystems because the sources
which have the greatest adverse effect or impact on sensitive elements
of the environment will be subject to the most stringent regulation.7 0
The sources subject to reductions are removed from the discretion of
the parties and the decision is grounded in environmental need.7 7
Under this approach, the parties coordinate their efforts and maximize
the effect of the NO. emissions reductions. 8
The NO, Protocol is also important because of the emphasis it places
on its regular review in light of the latest scientific and technological
developments.7 9 This approach ensures that the most advanced and cost
effective science and technology will be incorporated in the protocol.8 0
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON OZONE LAYER
DEPLETION
Steps were taken to protect the ozone layer prior to the implementa-
tion of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(Vienna Convention). Chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) were banned from
use in aerosol propellants in North America in the 1970's because of
concern over the destructive effects such substances had on the ozone
layer.81 Other nations also expressed concern as to the effects of these
73. Note, supra note 18, at 475.
74. Id. at 474-75.
75. Id.
76. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. I para. 7. The determination of critical
loads is made for numerous pollutants in various ecosystems. Note, supra note 18, at
474 n.198. This ensures that sources which have the greatest impact on the environ-
ment will be subject to the restrictions of the protocol. Id. at 474.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 475.
79. Id. at 476.
80. Id.
81. 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (1978). The Environmental Protection Agency and the
Food and Drug Administration banned CFC use in aerosol propellants in 1978. Id.
Speculation on whether the ozone layer was subject to depletion began in 1974. Row-
land, A Threat to Earth's Protective Shield, EPA J., Dec. 1986, at 5.
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substances on the ozone layer.82 The discovery of the hole in the ozone
layer over Antarctica and ozone loss over North America only under-
scored the need for an international agreement to handle this poten-
tially dangerous development.8 3 The mounting scientific evidence con-
cerning the severely effected condition of the ozone layer caused by the
continued use of CFCs led directly to the implementation of the Vienna
Convention."
A. VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE
LAYER
The Vienna Convention was adopted on March 22, 1985.85 This
agreement recognized the potentially harmful impact of ozone layer de-
terioration on the global environment and the need for further research
and monitoring of ozone depleting CFCs.8  The Vienna Convention,
like the Geneva Convention, did not include any substantive pollution
reduction measures or time tables for such reductions. 87 The Vienna
Convention simply provided a framework for future cooperation and
more specific obligations.88
CFCs were invented in the 1930's for use in refrigeration. Id. CFCs are stable, non-
toxic, and safe. Boyle, Forecast for Disaster, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 16, 1987, at
78, 81. They are used for air conditioning, refrigeration, and foams used in packaging
and storage containers. Id. The same characteristics which make CFCs ideal for these
uses also make them dangerous to the ozone layer. Rowland, supra note 81, at 5.
82. Wexler, supra note 17, at 6. UNEP is the source of the international consensus
on ozone depletion. Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a
Great Notionj, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335, 338 (1984).
83. Wexler, supra note 17, at 3. NASA estimates a 1.7 to 3% loss, depending on
latitude, in the ozone layer over the United States and Canada. Id. at 3 n.4. NOAA
evidence shows increasing levels of chemicals in the arctic; existence of these chemicals
is thought to precede ozone depletion. D. Dumanoski, Arctic Data Raises Fear of
Wider Ozone Depletion, Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 1989, at 1. The level of lethal chemi-
cals was 50 times higher than normal and comparable to that found in Antarctica
where dramatic ozone depletion occurs in the spring. Id.
84. Wexler, supra note 17, at 1. Recent data has shown ozone depletion to be more
widespread than previously thought. Id. at 3.
85. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted and openedfor signature Mar. 22, 1985 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988), reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The convention was ratified by: Argen-
tina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada,
Chile, China, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Phil-
lipines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo,
Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Venezuela, and the E.E.C. Id.
86. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 229. For an explanation of how CFCs damage
the ozone layer, see id. at 36-39.
87. Id. at 230.
88. Id. at 229.
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Articles 2 through 5 contain the substantive obligations of the agree-
ment. Although parties are not required to take any steps to prevent
the depletion of the ozone layer, the parties are obligated to cooperate
in the research and monitoring of ozone layer depletion.89 Article 2
contains the agreement's general obligations. Under this provision, par-
ties must take appropriate measures to protect human health and the
environment from activities which deplete the ozone layer.90 The par-
ties also must cooperate in the scientific study of ozone layer deple-
tion,"' in taking appropriate measures to combat continued modifica-
tion of the ozone layer,92 in formulating measures to address the
problem of ozone layer depletion, 93 and in implementing the agreement
itself. These obligations can become more specific depending on agree-
ment among the parties on future protocols under the Convention.9 4
Articles 3, 4, and 5 contain obligations that expand cooperation and
the exchange of information in the fields of research, monitoring, and
assessment.95 These obligations mirror the parties' recognition that
before any reduction measures can be imposed, further research and
study is required.96 These provisions are crucial because much of the
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 2, para. 2.
90. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 2, para. 1.
91. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 2, para. 2(a). This provision requires
cooperation in research and information exchange to facilitate a better understanding
of the ozone depletion problem. Id.
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 2, para. 2(b). This provision requires
"[Cooperation in taking appropriate legislative or administrative measures and in har-
monizing appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities...
which have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from ozone layer modifica-
tion." Id.
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 2, para. 2(c). The provision requires
cooperation in formulation of agreed measures, procedures, and standards for the im-
plementation of this convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols. Id.
94. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 230.
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at arts. 3-5. Article 3 focuses on research
and systematic observations. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at art. 3. It outlines
specific areas which need research and scientific assessment, calls upon parties to pro-
mote or establish joint or complementary programs for systematic observation of the
ozone layer, and requires cooperation in the collection and transmission of research and
observational data. Id.
Article 4 focuses on cooperation in the legal, scientific, and technical fields. Vienna
Convention, supra note 85, at art. 4. This provision obligates the parties to facilitate
and encourage data and information relevant to the Vienna Convention. Id. The infor-
mation is supplied to bodies agreed upon by the parties and is to be kept confidential
until it is available to all parties. Id. Information exchange must be consistent with the
national laws, regulations and practices regarding patents, trade secrets, and protection
of confidential and proprietary information. Id.
Article 5 simply requires the parties to keep the conference of parties informed of
the measures they are taking in this regard. Vienna Convention, supra note 85, art. 5.
96. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 229.
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relevant information on alternative technologies for CFCs is well
guarded and commercially valuable.97
The Vienna Convention is important for many reasons. First, in the
same manner that the Geneva Convention recognized the problem of
long-range transboundary air pollution, the Vienna Convention recog-
nizes the adverse effects that modification of the ozone layer has on the
global environment. 8 This agreement puts the topic on the table for
international discussion, research, and action.99
The construction of the Vienna Convention is also important. This
umbrella agreement allows the adoption of further protocols which can
be more specific and detailed as more information becomes known
about the dangers to the ozone layer and the remedies for the prob-
lem. 10 In this regard, the Vienna Convention serves as a very impor-
tant first step in combatting ozone layer depletion. 01
B. PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER
The Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol) was adopted and signed on September 16, 1987.102 This pro-
97. Id. at 232. Information on alternative substances to CFCs and alternative tech-
nology is primarily in private hands and would not be made available for fear that a
competitor would gain access to it. Id.
98. Id. at 229.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 230-31. Article 2, which contains the general obligations of the conven-
tion, is constructed to increase in specificity depending on the protocols agreed upon.
Id. The provision is also able to expand as knowledge of the dangers to the ozone layer
increases since "activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer" trigger
the obligation. Id.
101. Id. at 229.
102. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and
opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), reprinted in 26
I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The protocol was ratified by:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France,
Ghana, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pan-
ama, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, the U.K., the U.S., Venezuela,
and the E.E.C. Id. See generally Doniger, Politics of the Ozone Layer, IssuEs Sci. &
TECH., 86 (1988) (stating that standards tougher than the Montreal Protocol are re-
quired); Comment, Thinning Air, Better Beware: Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone
Layer, 6 DICK. J. IN'L L. 87 (1987) (discussing the need for an international agree-
ment to combat ozone layer destruction); Note, The Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Can It Keep Us All from Needing Hats. Sunglasses.
and Suntan Lotion?, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & Cobsp. L. REv. 509 (1988) (reviewing the
Montreal Protocol to determine its sufficiency in arresting ozone layer depletion): Com-
ment, The Montreal Protocol. The First Step Toward Protecting the Global Ozone
Layer, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 793 (1988) (stating that reductions beyond those
required under the Montreal Protocol are necessary to respond to ozone layer deple-
tion); Comment, The Montreal Protocol. Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone
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tocol to the Vienna Convention contains three important articles which
regulate the production and consumption of CFCs10 3 and halons. 0 4
Article 2 outlines CFC and halon control measures. 10 5 This article
initially limits CFC consumption and production to current levels in
1990.10 Parties must then reduce consumption and production levels
by twenty percent by 19931"7 and by fifty percent by 1998.108 Parties
must also freeze halon consumption and production by 1992.109 Article
2 allows smaller producing countries to transfer production 1 and al-
Layer, 63 WASH. L. REv. 997 (1988) (discussing the causes of ozone layer depletion
and the Montreal Protocol's response).
103. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at annex A. This provision lists CFC- 11,
CFC-12, CFC-1 13, CFC-1 14, and CFC-1 15 as controlled substances under the agree-
ment. Id.
104. Id. The agreement lists halon-1211, halon-1301, and halon-2402 as controlled
substances subject to regulation. Id.
105. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2. "Consumption" is defined as
"production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances (CFC's or halons)."
Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 1, para. 6.
106. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2. CFC consumption is to be lim-
ited, by 1990, to the calculated level of consumption of 1986. Id. A party producing
CFCs may exceed its calculated 1986 level of production by ten percent if necessary to
satisfy domestic need. Id. "Production" is defined as "the amount of controlled sub-
stances produced minus the amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the
Parties." Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 1 para. 5.
Under this provision, production is calculated by multiplying annual production of
each controlled substance by its ozone depleting potential and adding together imports
and exports, respectively, and consumption. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art.
3. The use of an adjusted production level ensures that both producing parties and
importing parties have an incentive to sign the agreement. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,
IssuEs Sci. & TECH. 43, 49 (1989).
107. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2, para. 3. This provision requires a
reduction to 80% of their 1986 levels. Id. The ten percent exception still applies if
necessary to satisfy domestic need. Id. Under this exception a qualifying party would
only have to reduce consumption and production to 90% of their 1986 levels. Id.
108. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2, para. 4. Parties must reduce
their consumption and production levels to 50% of their 1986 levels. Id. Parties may
exceed this production limit by 15 % if: (1) necessary to satisfy domestic needs of par-
ties operating under Article 5; and (2) for the purpose of industrial rationalization. Id.
"Industrial rationalization" is defined as "the transfer of all or a portion of the calcu-
lated level of production of one party to another, for the purpose of achieving economic
efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant clo-
sures." Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 1, para. 8.
109. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2, para. 2. As of 1992, parties may
not exceed their 1986 level of consumption. Id. Production must be similarly limited
except it may exceed the 1986 level by ten percent in the case of necessity to satisfy
basic domestic needs of parties subject to article 5 and for purposes of industrial ration-
alization. Id. No further reductions of halon consumption or production are included in
the protocol. Id.
110. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2, para. 5. A party whose 1986
CFC production level is less than 25 kilotons may transfer to or receive from another
party excess production if the combined total of the two parties does not exceed the
applicable limits. Id.
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lows countries with long-range plans to maintain their objectives by ad-
ding to production.111
Article 4 regulates the trade of CFCs and halons with non-parties."'
This provision bans trade in controlled substances, 13 as well as prod-
ucts containing controlled substances, with non-parties.'1 4 The protocol
requires consideration of a ban on products produced with, but not con-
taining, controlled substances within five years."0 Article 4 also dis-
courages the export of technology and financial support for production
or utilization of controlled substances. 16
Article 5 outlines the special situation of developing countries under
this agreement. Countries listed by the United Nations as "lesser devel-
oped countries"' 7 qualify under this article. The article allows develop-
I11. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2, para. 6. A party not subject to
article 5 that has CFC producing facilities under construction or contract and provided
for in national legislation prior to 1987 may add production generated from such facili-
ties to their 1986 levels of production if such production does not raise per capita CFC
consumption above 0.5 kilograms. Id. This article specifically applies to the U.SS.R.
which was constructing large CFC production facilities at the time of the 1987 negotia-
tions. Tripp, The UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing Countries
Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 20 N.Y.UJ.
INT'L L. & POL. 733, 737 n.16 (1988).
112. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4.
113. Id. at para. 1-2. The import of controlled substances from non-parties is
banned within a year after the protocol enters into force. Id. Controlled substances are
defined as "a substance listed in Annex A (CFCs and halons) to this Protocol, whether
alone or in a mixture." Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. I, para. 4. The
definition of controlled substances excludes "any such substance or mixture which is in
a manufactured product other than a container used for the transportation or storage
of the substance listed." Id.
Developing countries subject to article 5 must stop exporting controlled substances to
non-parties by 1993. Montreal protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4, para. 2. The import
bans outlined in article 4 are not applicable to non-parties in full compliance with arti-
cles 2 and 4. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4, para. 8. The inclusion of the
trade measures marks a concerted effort by the parties to make the effect of this proto-
col as broad and wide ranging as possible. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 238.
114. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4, para. 3. Within three years of
entry into force, the parties must establish an annex listing products containing the
controlled substances and within one year must ban the import of such products. Id.
This ban is only applicable to parties that have not objected to the annex. Id. This
clause was included due to the unwillingness of some parties to commit to any ban
without specific knowledge of which products would be covered. J. BRUNNEE, supra
note 17, at 246.
115. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4, para. 4. The ban becomes effec-
tive one year after such determination. Id.
116. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 4, paras. 5-7. The export of tech-
nology for producing and utilizing CFCs or halons is discouraged and the parties agree
to refrain from new financial support for the export of products or technology which
would facilitate the production of controlled substances. Id.
117. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 246. The developing states under the Montreal
Protocol are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
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ing countries with a consumption level below 0.3 kg per capita to delay
their compliance with article 2 by ten years if they do not exceed the
0.3 kg per capita consumption level. 118 In addition, other parties agree
to facilitate these developing countries' access to new and alternative
technologies." 9
The Montreal Protocol is important for a number of reasons. First,
the gradual phase out of global emissions provides parties with suffi-
cient time to develop and implement new or alternative technologies. 20
The protocol covers a wide range of CFCs and halons - more than
originally addressed during the negotiations.' 2' The coverage of halons
is critical because although CFCs are released at rates forty times
higher, halons' ozone depletion potential is eight times higher.122
The provision restricting trade with non-parties broadens the scope of
the agreement by indirectly applying the weight of the agreement
against the entire global community.' 2 3 The approach taken must be
global because ozone depletion is a global problem. Reducing the mar-
ket for goods which contain or are produced with controlled substances
is an effective measure to reduce the possible advantage gained by re-
fusing to sign the treaty. 24 Without this provision, importing countries
would have to bear the brunt of reductions if producing nations in-
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verdi,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democtratic Kampuchea, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ja-
maica, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos People's Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, St. Chris-
topher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vantuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Helsinki, May 6,
1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/02L.Pro.1/5 at 18-19.
118. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 5, para. I.
119. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 5, para. 2-3.
120. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 242-45.
121. Id. at 242. Although CFCs 11, 12, 113, and 114 were clearly going to be
covered, the status of CFC 115 and halons 1211, 1301, and 2402 was unclear. Id.
122. See MacKenzie, High Noon for Ozone in Montreal, NEw SCIENTIST, Sept. 3,
1987 at 24 (describing the effects of both CFCs and halons on the ozone layer).
123. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 238.
124. Id.
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creased their domestic consumption. 25 Thus, an incentive exists for im-
porting nations to sign the protocol because only exports to non-parties
have to come out of domestic consumption.1 26
Of course, developing countries are not subject to the phase out pro-
visions if their consumption rate is below a certain per capita level.127
This allows the developing countries to use the technology and products
on a small scale.1 28 Signature to the treaty is actually beneficial be-
cause the industrial nations agree to give the developing nations access
to new and alternative technologies and products.1 29 Recognizing the
interests of developing nations is an important element in encouraging
them to sign on to the treaty.13 1
III. UNITED STATES CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENT OF
1990
President Bush signed the Clean Air Act Amendment 3' on Novem-
ber 15, 1990, in a ceremony at the East Room of the White House.1 32
The new law provides for many new standards for pollutants in the
atmosphere and tougher regulation and enforcement of both the new
and existing standards."' The amendment contains comprehensive pro-
visions covering acid deposition and stratospheric ozone layer depletion,
as well as indirect controls on emissions of some greenhouse gases.1m
The Clean Air Act Amendment is important to this analysis because it
contains provisions which must be included in any effective global
warming agreement.
125. Id. The CFC producing countries tend to be the industrialized nations while
the developing countries are the importing nations. Tripp, supra note I 11, at 744.
126. Benedick, supra note 106, at 49. Importing nations that did not become par-
ties to the agreement would risk losing access to their supplies. Id.
127. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 5, para. 1.
128. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 250.
129. Id. at 247.
130. Id. at 238-39.
131. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990) (amendments to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.). The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 385
(1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq.).
132. Comment, Great Expectations: Reviewing the 101st Congress, 21 ENvTL L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10008, 10016 (1991).
133. Id. at 10017-19.
134. Id. at 10016-17.
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A. ACID DEPOSITION AND LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR
POLLUTION
Titles I, II, and IV of the Clean Air Act Amendment regulate and
control the emissions which contribute to acid rain.1 35 Title IV estab-
lishes the acid rain control program.136 This program caps utility emis-
sions of SO, at 8.9 million tons per year by the year 2000;137 industrial
emissions of SO, at 5.6 million tons per year once such a level has been
reached; 3 8 and reduces utility emissions of NO, by 2.0 million tons per
year by 1996.'31 This title also provides for the allocation of pollution
allowances. 140 Plants which have emission rates below the cap may ac-
crue allowances for later use or for transfer or sale to other plants
which exceed the emissions cap.14 1
135. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. I-II, IV, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990) [hereinafter Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990].
136. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 401, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990).
137. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 401, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990) (creating
Clean Air Act §§ 404-405 to establish utility emissions controls under the Acid Rain
Control Program). SO2 reductions from utility sources will be completed in two phases.
Id.
Phase I SO2 reductions are required from 111 large, dirty plants (100 megawatts or
more with emissions rates above 2.5 lbs. per million British thermal unit (lbs./mm
Btu)) listed in the text by Jan. 1, 1995. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104
Stat. 2584 (creating Clean Air Act § 404). Each listed source must reduce emissions to
2.5 lbs./mm Btu multiplied by the plant's annual average baseline fuel consumption in
1985-87. Id.
Phase II SO2 reductions tighten the limits on large, dirty sources (75 megawatts or
more and emission rates above 1.2 lbs./mm Btu) to 1.2 lbs./mm Btu multiplied the
plant's fuel consumption baseline. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat.
2584 (creating Clean Air Act § 405). In addition small and clean plants (below 75
megawatts or with 1985 emission rates below 1.2 lbs./mm Btu) must also limit their
emissions. Id. Many different formulas are used for small plants and clean units. Id.
138. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 406(b), 104 Stat. 2632. The EPA must
inventory national annual SO2 emissions from industrial sources by January 1, 1995.
Once such level is expected to reach levels greater than 5.6 million tons per year, the
EPA may take whatever measures appropriate to cap SO2 emissions at 5.6 million tons
annually. Id.
139. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat. 549 (creating Clean Air
Act § 407). Utility units must meet the NO, reduction levels by the same dates they
must meet the SO2 reduction requirements. Id. The NO, emission rates for different
types of utility units are capped at between 0.50 and 0.45 lbs./mm Btu. Id. The reduc-
tion provisions of this section are estimated by ICF Resources to reduce emissions by
2.0 million tons per year. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, ENV'T & ENERGY
STUDY INST., Oct. 24, 1990, at 9 [hereinafter House-Senate Floor Brief].
140. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat. 2584 (creating Clean
Air Act § 403). EPA may also allocate allowances which it creates, to apply to utilities
which use emission scrubbing controls. Id.
141. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat. 2584.
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Title II establishes tighter tailpipe emission standards for mobile
sources."4 2 A two tiered system of tailpipe standards for new mobile
sources will cause a sixty percent reduction in NO, emissions under tier
I by 1998.13 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have
to consider which tier II standards to implement by the turn of the
century but if the EPA fails to take action, the standards would reduce
tier I emission levels by half.14 This title also requires the EPA to
promulgate more stringent emissions requirements for all gasoline fu-
eled motor vehicles.' 4 5 Automobiles are a major source of NO. emis-
sions and more stringent tailpipe emission standards are an important
NO, reduction measure.'46
Title I revises the Clean Air Act requirements for areas that have
not attained health based ambient air quality standards.147 The Clean
Air Act required states to establish pollution attainment plans for vari-
ous types of atmospheric pollution. 4 8 Ozone, formed from volatile or-
ganic compounds and NO., is the major pollutant controlled by this
provision.49 This title requires that the same control requirements for
ozone areas also apply to major sources of NO, and sulphur oxides
(SO).150
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1977) amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §
203, 104 Stat. 2474.
143. Id. This section sets tailpipe emission standards for model years after 1993.
Id. Automobiles and light duty trucks under 3750 lbs. may not emit more than 0.4 or
0.6 grams per mile (gpm) of NO., depending on whether the useful life of the vehicle is
5 years/50,000 miles or 10 years/100,000 miles. Id. By 1994, 40% of new models
must meet these standards, by 1995 80%, and by 1996 all new models must meet these
standards. Id. Vehicles over 3750 lbs. and other heavy duty vehicles must meet differ-
ent standards. Id.
144. Id. If the EPA does not make a determination as to new standards, new mod-
els after the year 2003 may emit no more than 2.0 gpm of NO.. Id.
145. Id. These measures do not reduce NO, emissions directly, the object of these
regulations is to reduce hydrocarbon emissions and require the installation in motor
vehicles of devices to signal when the emissions control systems are malfunctioning. Id.
146. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 12. Motor vehicles account for 40% of NO.
emissions. Id. Fossil fueled power plants, the next biggest source, account for 30% of
NO, emissions. Id.
147. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. 1, 104 Stat. 2399. This title provides
additional provisions for ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter nonattain-
ment areas, as well as for areas designated nonattainment for SO,, NO,, and lead. Id.
148. Id.
149. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 2. VOCs, also known as hydro-
carbons, are primarily emitted from fossil fuel combustion stationary sources and mo-
tor vehicles. Id. When VOC and NO, are combined they form ozone, one of the green-
house gases. Id.
150. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 106, 104 Stat. 2463 (creating Clean
Air Act §§ 191-2 to establish nonattainment provisions for SO,, NO,, and lead). States
which contain a nonattainment area for these substances must implement a plan within
18 months of the enactment of the Amendment that meets the requirements of the
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These provisions are important for two reasons. First, the controls
and restrictions placed on SO, and NO, emissions from utility,' 5 ' indus-
trial,' and mobile sources' 5" are substantial. Second, these restrictions
are more stringent and comprehensive than the Geneva Convention or
its protocols.' 54 Many environmental groups have criticized the delay in
the implementation of the pollution controls but the breadth and effect
of the agreement cannot be ignored. 55
The allowance system established under Title IV provides an impor-
tant incentive for the reduction of emissions below stipulated levels. 15
The allowance system operates by allowing utilities which can reduce
emissions efficiently to do so while selling their allowances to utilities
whose reductions would be more expensive.'5 7 This system cuts the to-
tal cost of emissions reductions 158 and encourages the use of new
technology.159
B. PROTECTION OF THE STRATOSPHERIC OZONE LAYER
Title VI of the Clean Air Act Amendment establishes a program for
stratospheric ozone protection. 6 0 The program will phase out the pro-
duction and consumption of substances destructive to the stratospheric
provisions for ozone nonattainment areas. Id. The specific requirements of the nonat-
tainment plan provisions are outlined in Clean Air Act § 172(c)(I)-(9), 42 U.S.C. §
7502 (1977) amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 102, 104 Stat. 2410.
151. See supra notes 137, 139 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Air Act§§ 404-5 to establish utility emissions controls under the Acid Rain Control Program).
152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990).
153. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Clean Air Act
Amendment requirements for motor vehicles).
154. See supra notes 24-78 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the
Geneva Convention).
155. Comment, supra note 132, at 10017.
156. Hershberg, Buying and Selling the Right to Pollute, COURIER J., Nov. 26,
1990, § B, at 8. Utilities which have clean burning fuel technology or capacity to spare
can make millions of dollars per year off the sale of allowances. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The cost of buying allowances would be lower than the cost of implement-
ing new technology for some utilities. Id.
159. Id. The use of pollution scrubbing technology would be encouraged because
the cost of a scrubber would be offset by the value of the emissions allowances gained
through its use. Id. One midwestern utility claims a scrubber would cut its emissions by
70,000 tons per year. Id. If allowances were worth $600 per ton, a conservative esti-
mate, the allowances gained would be worth $55.8 million. Id. The annual cost of the
scrubber, $47.5 million, would be offset by the emissions reductions produced. Id.
160. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2584 (1990).
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ozone layer."' 1 The most destructive CFCs, along with three halons and
carbon tetrachloride, will be phased out of production and consumption
by the year 2000.162 These requirements are more stringent than the
Montreal Protocol both in the number of substances covered and the
timetable to total phase out. 63
The production and consumption levels of hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs) are to be frozen by 2015 and phased out by 2030.1" HCFCs
161. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (creating Clean
Air Act §§ 604-5 to establish substances controlled by the Stratospheric Ozone Protec-
tion Program). Production means the manufacture of a substance from any raw mate-
rial or feedstock chemical. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648(creating Clean Air Act § 601 (11) to define production under the Stratospheric Ozone
Protection Program). Production does not include manufacture of any substance that is
entirely consumed in the manufacture of another chemical or the reuse or recycling of
a substance. Id. Consumption means the amount produced plus the amount imported
minus the amount exported. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648(creating Clean Air Act § 601(6) to define consumption under the Stratospheric Ozone
Protection Program). This term is used in a manner consistent with the Montreal Pro-
tocol. Id. All regulations regarding the phase out of consumption of these substances
are to be promulgated by the EPA and must follow the same schedule as the produc-
tion phase out. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 604(c) to establish the consumption phase
out provisions under the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program).
162. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (creating Clean
Air Act § 602(a) to list Class I substances under the Stratospheric Ozone Protection
Program). Ozone depleting substances are divided in two classes, with Class I sub-
stances to be phased out of production by 2000. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 604(a)).
Class I substances are further divided into groups which determines their baseline year.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (creating Clean Air Act §
602(a)). Class I substances include; (Group I) CFC- 11, CFC-12, CFC-113, CFC-! 14,
CFC-115; (Group II) halon-1211, halon-1301, halon-2402; (Group III) CFC-13, CFC-
111, CFC-1 12, CFC-211, CFC-212, CFC-213, CFC-214, CFC-215, CFC-216, CFC-
217; (Group IV) carbon tetrachloride; and (Group V) methyl chloroform. Id. Groups I
and II use 1986 as their baseline year and Groups III, IV, and V use 1989 as their
baseline year. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 602, 104
Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 601(2) to define baseline year). The phase
out period is over 9 years, starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 § 602 104 Stat. 2648 (creating Clean Air Act § 604(a)). Methyl chloro-
form production and consumption will not be phased out until 2002. Id.
163. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 14. The Montreal Protocol cov-
ers CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-I13, CFC-I14, CFC-I15, halon-1211, halon-1301, and
halon-2402. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, Annex A. The Montreal Protocol does
not require a total phase out of these ozone depleting substances but rather a freeze
and then reduction of consumption. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at art. 2. The
Clean Air Act Amendment thus covers a larger number of substances and has a more
stringent reduction schedule than the Montreal Protocol. House-Senate Floor Brief,
supra note 139, at 14.
164. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (creating Clean
Air Act § 605(b)-(c) to establish Class II phase out procedures under the Stratospheric
Ozone Protection Program). HCFCs are Class II substances and production must be
frozen at an amount determined by EPA by 2015. Id. These substances must be phased
out by 2030. Id. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 602,
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are less destructive to the ozone layer 165 and are most likely the interim
substitutes for CFCs.166 For this reason, the phase out schedule is
longer. Specific exceptions are provided for both CFC and HCFC
phase outs. 16 7
The comprehensiveness of the Clean Air Act Amendment and its
stringent phase out requirements are vital aspects of the legislation. It
is a more powerful weapon in fighting ozone layer depletion than the
Montreal Protocol.16 8 This legislation removes not only the most de-
structive ozone depleting substances but also those which have rela-
tively low depletion potentials. 6 9 These steps encourage the develop-
ment of alternatives and more effectively reduce the danger posed to
the environment by the depletion of the ozone layer.' 7
C. THE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GASES
The Clean Air Act Amendment controls and reduces the emission of
greenhouse gases both directly and indirectly. 7 Ozone and CFC emis-
sions are directly controlled by the amendment; the control of ozone by
Titles I and I1172 and CFCs by Title VI. 1" CO, however, is indirectly
104 Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 602(b) to list Class II substances
subject to the phase out procedures under the Stratospheric Ozone Protection
Program).
165. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 602, 104 Stat.
2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 602(e) to list ozone depletion potentials for
controlled substances under the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program). Ozone-de-
pletion potential means a factor reflecting the ozone-depletion potential of a substance
as compared to CFC-1 1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §
602, 104 Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 601(10) to define ozone-deple-
tion potential). The factor is based on a substance's atmospheric lifetime, the molecular
weight of bromine and chlorine, and the substance's ability to be photolytically disasso-
ciated, and upon other factors determined to be an accurate measure of relative ozone-
depletion potential. Id. The five most destructive CFCs have ozone-depletion potentials
of 1.0, halon-2402 has an ozone-depletion potential of 10.0, while HCFC ozone-deple-
tion potentials range from 0.02 to 0.1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-549, § 602, 104 Stat. 2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 602(e)).
166. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 14.
167. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 602, 104 Stat.
2648 (1990) (creating Clean Air Act § 604(d) to establish exceptions to the phase out
procedures under the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program). Specific exceptions ex-
ist for the essential uses of methyl chloroform, medical devices, and aviation safety. Id.
168. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 14.
169. See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Air Act
Amendment § 602).
170. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 14.
171. Weisskopf & Booth, In West, U.S. Stands Alone on Warming Issue; Europe-
ans Display Unity on Stabilizing Gases, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1990, at A5.
172. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. 1-11, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990). Title I regulates ozone under the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
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controlled by Title IV.174 Methane reduction is to be studied further
under Title VI. 176 These provisions focus on combatting the problems
of air pollution, ozone depletion, and acid deposition rather than at-
tempting to diminish the greenhouse effect.
The amendment will reduce the emissions of some greenhouse
gases. 17 6 The provisions, although a first step, are not a substitute for
legislation specifically dealing with the problem of global warming.
While further study, as in the case of methane, is provided for, many
environmental groups and other nations are calling for more substan-
tive steps to be taken .17  The Clean Air Act Amendment will have the
dards and Title II regulates the emissions of hydrocarbons and NO,, which together
form ozone, from mobile sources. Id.
173. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399, 2650 (1990). See supra notes 147-157 and accompanying text (discussing how
Title VI controls and regulates the release of CFCs).
174. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399, 2584 (1990). Title IV controls the emissions of utility plants which generate
power through the combustion of fossil fuels. Id. See supra notes 128-146 and accom-
panying text (discussing the provisions under Title IV of the Clean Air Act
Amendment).
Although the Clean Air Act Amendment does not explicitly limit CO2 emissions,
CO, is conveyed into the atmosphere directly and indirectly through a process regu-
lated by the legislation. GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 3, at 8. The effect this legis-
lation will have on the reduction of greenhouse gases is subject to much debate.
Drozdiak, U.S. Refuses to Pledge Limit on Greenhouse Gases Emissions, Wash. Post,
Nov. 8, 1990, at A22, col. 1. Dr. John Knauss, Chief of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, claims the revised Clean Air Act will lead to significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Id. Environmental groups claim the EPA esti-
mates CO, emissions will be reduced by 68 million tons over the next 10 years, this is
only 2 percent of total U.S. output. Id.
175. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 603, 104 Stat.
2670 (1990). Within 2 years the EPA must inventory the sources of methane emissions
and promulgate economically justified actions to control and reduce methane concen-
trations from the sources identified during the inventory process. Id.
176. Drozdiak, supra note 174, at A22. The actual reductions are subject to dis-
pute between the Bush administration and environmental groups. Id. The debate over
the effect of the current legislation on the greenhouse effect was renewed when an EPA
report claimed that recent measures taken by the U.S. would freeze CO, emissions at
the 1987 level through 2000 and actually cut these emissions four percent by 2010.
Stevens, supra note 20, at 18. The measures cited by EPA to have this effect include
the Amendment and recent energy saving measures mandated by the Department of
Energy (DOE). Id. These claims are disputed by environmental groups which believe
specific targets must be set for actual reductions or freezes to work. Id.
177. Drozdiak, supra note 174, at A22.
178. Weisskopf & Booth, supra note 171, at A5. Eighteen West European coun-
tries, along with Japan, Australia, and other industrialized countries have committed to
timetables reducing or stabilizing emissions of greenhouse gases, including CO, the
most important greenhouse gas. Id. Germany has vowed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 30% within the next 15 years. Drozdiak, supra note 174, at A22.
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effect of reducing the emissions of some greenhouse gases even though
it will do so indirectly. 1 9
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A GLOBAL WARMING
AGREEMENT
The global warming conference could be the turning point in the in-
ternational effort to combat the greenhouse effect. To ensure a success-
ful conference the parties must construct an agreement which brings all
the important international players into the agreement process. The
agreement should contain a broad and flexible convention in which the
signatories acknowledge the problem, the need to take steps, and the
willingness to obligate themselves to resolve the problem.
The convention should be followed by protocols which further define
the problem and implement substantive measures to stabilize or reduce
the emissions of greenhouse gases. These protocols must link actual re-
ductions to environmental goals. If these steps are taken, substantive
progress can be made in the fight against global warming.
These recommendations apply to the agreement necessary to ade-
quately deal with global warming. This agreement may or may not be
constructed at the global warming conference. Therefore, even if the
global warming conference is unable to create an agreement to address
the problem, these recommendations are important elements for any
agreement effectively addressing the problems associated with the
greenhouse effect.
A. THE CONVENTION
The Convention is the starting point for any international coopera-
tive effort to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. It must provide
a framework for future cooperation and specific obligations. 180 Flexibil-
ity within the Convention is important because it may promote a will-
ingness for some countries to adopt it.' 81 The major accomplishment of
the Geneva and Vienna Conventions was their recognition of the
problems of transboundary air pollution and ozone depletion, and the
need for international efforts to combat these problems.182
179. Weisskopf, supra note 19, at A3. The measures passed to combat acid rain
also reduce CO, emissions. Id.
180. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 229.
181. Note, supra note 18, at 457.
182. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 17, at 229.
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1. Acknowledgement
The first part of the Convention on global warming must acknowl-
edge the problem of global warming and the need to take substantive
action to combat its effects. 83 The controversy over the certainty of the
scientific evidence will make even this task difficult.' 8' The Convention
also should contain several general provisions which recognize the prob-
lem of global warming, mandate cooperation in studying the problem,
and require cooperation in addressing the problem with specific sub-
stantive measures.18 5
2. Basic Obligations
After a declaration that recognizes the problem of global warming
and its potential detrimental effects on the planet, the Convention
should create a number of general obligations. The first would obligate
the parties to take appropriate measures to protect human health and
the environment from the effects of global warming.186
A second important obligation would require parties to cooperate in
the scientific study of global warming.18 7 Such an obligation would nec-
essarily be specific as to how such cooperation is to manifest itself.688
183. See supra notes 31-32, 90 and accompanying text (discussing the acknowl-
edgement provisions in the Geneva and Vienna Conventions).
184. Weisskopf & Booth, supra note 171, at AS. There are deep divisions in the
Bush administration on the question of the greenhouse effect. Id. EPA Administrator
Reilly and Secretary of State Baker both support direct action on global warming. Id.
White House chief of staff Sununu and science advisor Bromley both believe there is
insufficient evidence of the greenhouse effect to warrant any direct action and have
appeared to set the policy for the Bush administration. Id.
185. See supra notes 33-34, 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the coopera-
tion provisions of the Geneva and Vienna Conventions).
186. See supra notes 31-32, 90 and accompanying text (discussing the acknowl-
edgement provisions of the Geneva and Vienna Conventions).
187. See supra notes 34, 90 and accompanying text (discussing the scientific study
provisions of the Geneva and Vienna Conventions). This obligation is important for two
reasons. First, it ensures that the most up to date scientific information is available to
all parties and assists in the completion of research necessary to further understand the
nature and extent of the problem. Kriz, supra note 2, at 2750. The U.S., which is
responsible for 22% of the world's CO2 emissions, is unwilling to take any substantive
steps until the problem is more fully researched and there is stronger evidence of the
problem. Drozdiak, supra note 174, at A22.
Second, such an obligation would also ensure that no party could claim a lack of
evidence necessary to agree to substantive reductions if all parties have the same infor-
mation. Id.
188. See supra notes 34, 90 and accompanying text (discussing the scientific study
provisions of the Geneva and Vienna Conventions).
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The third obligation would require all parties to cooperate in formulat-
ing measures to address the problem of global warming. 8 '
Though these steps may seem insufficient, political reality and the
nature of the global warming problem require that the agreement en-
compass as many nations as possible, especially major emitters of
greenhouse gases. If a convention can be signed with these obligations
then the next task of constructing new protocols, containing the specific
reduction measures, can begin.
B. THE PROTOCOL(S)
The protocols to the Convention are the means by which the substan-
tive reductions necessary to combat global warming will take place.'90
These agreements must link environmental goals to actual reductions,
recognize the special needs of developing nations, provide an incentive
to reduce emissions below the stipulated levels, and be as comprehen-
sive in scope as possible. These objectives are necessary to ensure that
the protocols effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
1. Critical Loads
Tying actual emissions reductions to environmental goals is one of
the most important requirements of the protocols.' 9 ' The critical loads
approach determines the specific emissions level for each greenhouse
gas below which harmful effects to the environment do not occur.'9 2
Emissions would be capped at this level.' 9 3 The use of critical loads
ensures that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is directly re-
lated to the specific needs of the environment.19
189. See supra notes 33-34, at 93 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention and Article 2 of the Vienna Convention). This obligation is
general in nature, requiring parties to commit themselves to the general goal of com-
batting global warming without committing to any specific reductions. Id. This obliga-
tion would be similar to those contained in the Geneva and Vienna Convention. Id.
190. See supra notes 40-80, 102-130 and accompanying text (discussing the proto-
cols to the Geneva and Vienna Conventions).
191. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the establishment of
critical loads under the NO, Protocol). The NO, Protocol required the development of
critical loads, the maximum level of NO, emissions which would not cause adverse
consequences to a specific environmental region. NO, Protocol, supra note 61, at art. 2,
para. 3(a). This was a significant advancement over the flat rate percentage reduction
required by the SO2 Protocol. Note, supra note 18, at 474.
192. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing how critical loads arc
determined under the NO, Protocol).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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2. Developing Nations Clause
It may seem counterintuitive to allow certain nations not to make the
same commitment to reduce global warming, but it is necessary to
bring developing nations into the agreement."9 5 Greenhouse gas emis-
sions are tied to the combustion processes of industrialized nations. 9" It
would be inequitable to require developing nations to bear a dispropor-
tionate cost of the remedy.1 97 Therefore, a provision similar to Article 5
of the Montreal Protocol must be included in the protocols.
3. Allowance System
The protocol must also make the reduction of emissions below stipu-
lated levels an attractive goal. This could be accomplished by establish-
ing an allowance system.198 Nations with emission rates below a stipu-
lated level, determined by the critical load of the pollutant, could
accrue allowances.1 99
These allowances could be transferred or sold to nations that were
unable to meet their emissions reduction levels. 200 If total emissions
were subject to a cap, such a process would not defeat the purpose of
the treaty.20' Such a system would not only provide an incentive to
reduce emissions below the proscribed levels, but it would lower the
cost of emissions reductions and encourage the development of new
technology and recycling programs. 0 2
195. See supra notes 117-119, 127-130 and accompanying text (discussing Article
5 of the Montreal Protocol). The Montreal Protocol solves this problem by providing
for special treatment of developing countries. Montreal Protocol, supra note 102, at
art. 5. This provision has two important components. Id. It delays the implementation
of reductions for those nations that are developing countries and do not have per capita
emission rates above a certain level. Id. It also requires industrialized nations to share
alternative technology with the developing countries and assist them in acquiring such
technology. Id.
196. GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 3, at 8. The combustion of fossil fuels,
which include oil, gas, and coal, is the major source of CO,, the most important of the
greenhouse gases. Id. Other sources of greenhouse gases include automobiles, industrial
sources, and some natural sources. Id.
197. See Tripp, supra note 111, at 742 (discussing the inequity of developing na-
tions having to bear large cost of CFC reduction when their consumption rate is far
below that of the industrialized world).
198. See supra notes 140-141, 156-159 and accompanying text (discussing the al-
lowance system of the Clean Air Act Amendments).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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4. Comprehensive Scope
The protocol must be comprehensive, both in the types of substances
covered as well as the types of sources regulated.20 3 Existing interna-
tional agreements all suffer from loopholes which reduce the effect of
the pollution reduction measures mandated by these agreements.20 4 The
protocols must cover all the major sources, not only the most destruc-
tive ones.2 05 Therefore, the protocols should cover not just CO2, but all
greenhouse gases, and they should impose restrictions on all man-made
sources of these gases.
V. CONCLUSION
The global warming conference should first adopt a broad convention
which acknowledges the existence of the greenhouse effect and the need
for measures to effectively deal with it. The convention should be an
umbrella agreement which allows for more stringent protocols to be
adopted. Once such a convention is signed, the conference should then
formulate protocols which are comprehensive in scope and establish ac-
tual reductions tied to specific environmental goals.
Global warming is a problem which must be addressed. The use of
the convention - protocol approach ensures that the global community
will work together to find methods to deal with the problem. It also
allows time for science to further determine the extent of the problem
and how it can best be remedied. Success in constructing and imple-
menting such an agreement fulfills the present generation's responsibil-
ity for stewardship while failure ignores the dangers posed by this
phenomenon.
203. See supra notes 136-138, 151-155 and accompanying text (discussing the acid
rain control program of the Clean Air Act Amendment).
204. See supra notes 31-34, 50-56, 87 and accompanying text (discussing the loop-
holes in the Geneva Convention, SO 2 Protocol and the Vienna Convention).
205. House-Senate Floor Brief, supra note 139, at 14. The Clean Air Act Amend-
ment covers more ozone depleting substances than the Montreal Protocol. Id. See
supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text (discussing the more stringent coverage of
CFC's by the Clean Air Act Amendment).
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